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Abstract
The Court of Justice is using Article 10 of the EC Treaty more frequently, in a wide variety of
cases. This Article summarizes and comments briefly on more than forty cases which have been
decided and issues which have arisen since the Congress of FIDE, the Fédération Internationale
pour le Droit Européen, in Helsinki in 2000, where the case law on Article 10 was discussed at
length. The Court is continuing to draw a variety of practical conclusions from the general words
of the Article, elaborating and applying existing case-law, and ruling on both positive and negative
duties resulting from Article 10.

DEVELOPMENTS, ISSUES, AND NEW
REMEDIES - THE DUTIES OF NATIONAL
AUTHORITIES AND COURTS UNDER
ARTICLE 10 OF THE EC TREATY
John Temple Lang*
INTRODUCTION
Article 10 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") reads:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise
the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.1
The Court of Justice has ruled that this Article imposes a
wide variety of duties, involving procedural and substantive law,
on both national courts and non-judicial authorities. These duties are essentially constitutional in nature, since they concern
the overall relationship between the European Community and
its Member States.
The Court of Justice is using Article 10 of the EC Treaty
more frequently, in a wide variety of cases. This Article summarizes and comments briefly on more than forty cases which have
been decided and issues which have arisen since the Congress of
FIDE, the Fgderation Internationalepour le Droit Europen, in Helsinki in 2000, where the case law on Article 10 was discussed at
* Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton, Brussels; Professor, Trinity College, Dublin; Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Oxford.
1. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, art.
10, at 42, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, at 81 (ex Article 5) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on
European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice] (amending
Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC
Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom
Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
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length.2 The Court is continuing to draw a variety of practical
conclusions from the general words of the Article, elaborating
and applying existing case-law, and ruling on both positive and
negative duties resulting from Article 10.
One common difficulty with Article 10 case law is that the
Court does not always mention Article 10 expressly, even when
applying a principle which is clearly derived from Article 10, or
which has previously been held to derive from Article 10. Another difficulty is finding the best method to classify or synthesize the great variety of cases. It would be easy, but not very
meaningful, to group them all under the heading of "effectiveness" or complete application of Community law, where the
Court often merely uses the phrase "the duty to cooperate in
good faith . . .The Article discussed here used to be Article 5 of the EC
Treaty. It has been renumbered as Article 10, thus, it is convenient to refer to it here by its current number. The recent cases
are discussed here only insofar as they raise issues under that
Article.
The Actual and PotentialImportance of Article 10
Article 10 continues to be important for several reasons.
First, the Community (now the European Union, or "EU") relies
almost entirely on national authorities to carry out agreed poli2. See JOHN

TEMPLE LANG, GENERAL REPORT:

THE DUTIES OF COOPERATION OF NA-

TIONAL AUTHORITIES AND COURTS AND THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 10

EC TREATY,THE REPORT FOR THE XIX FIDE CONGRESS, HELSINKI 373-426 (vol. I), 65-72
(vol. IV) (Sundstr6m ed., 2000) [hereinafter HELSINKI GENERAL REPORT]; JEAN-ERIC DE
COCKBORNE ET AL., COMMENTAIRE MCGRET: LE DROIT DE LA CEE 25-43 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter COMMENTAIRE MEGRET]; John Temple Lang, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: The
Emergence of ConstitutionalPrinciples in the Case Law of the Court of Justice, 10 FoRDH
INT'L LJ. 503, 503-37 (1987); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 112-15, 330 (6th ed. 2001); MARC BLANQUET,
LARTICLE 5 DU TRAITt CEE: RECHERCHE SUR LES OBLIGATIONS DE FIDPLITE DES ETATS

(Paris 1994); Laurence W. Gormley, The Development of
General Principles of Law Within Article 10 (ex Article 5) EC, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 113 (Ulf Bernitz &Joakim Nergelius eds., 2000);John TemMEMBRES DE LA COMMUNAUTt

ple Lang, The Duties of National Courts under Community ConstitutionalLaw, 22 EUR. L.
REv. 3 (1997); John Temple Lang, The Duties of National Authorities Under Community
ConstitutionalLaw, 23 EUR. L. REv. 109 (1998);John Temple Lang, The Duties of Cooperation on NationalAuthorities and Courts UnderArticle 1O EC: Two More Reflections, 26 EUR. L.
REv. 84 (2001) [hereinafter Temple Lang, The Duties of Cooperation].
3. Roquette Freres SA v. Directeur General de la Concurrence, Case C-94/00, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-9011, 1 30.
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cies: it has not got the resources to carry them out itself. Second, Member States' powers and resources are much greater
than those of the EU, so that they have extensive opportunities
for obstructing, intentionally or otherwise, its policies. Third, it
is Article 10 which, in the absence of specific provisions or supplements, governs the whole relationship between EU law and
national legal systems - the relationship which in a federation
would be between federal and State law. Fourth, Article 10 creates justiciable issues, unlike, for example, subsidiarity, which
creates primarily policy, political, and barely-justiciable issues.
Fifth, in the international sphere the EU and the Member States
have an astonishing and unique variety of relationships: exclusive competences, concurrent powers, "mixed" agreements,
Member State membership of international organizations on
which the Community or EU has legislated, and so on. These
relationships give rise to many situations in which the Member
States and the EU need to cooperate, and Article 10 requires
and regulates that cooperation. Sixth, the Article has had so
many practical consequences under the EC Treaty that it is certain to have many more, in due course, in justice and home affairs, and perhaps in the area of foreign and security policy.
The importance of Article 10 is greatly underestimated.
There are several reasons for this. Perhaps the most important is
that when the Court gives a judgment which is in fact based on
Article 10, it usually refers to its previous judgments but not to
Article 10 itself. In particular, the Court repeatedly refers to the
equivalence and effectiveness principles, discussed below, without mentioning Article 10. Another reason is that Article 10 has
so many consequences in so many different and apparently unconnected spheres that not many lawyers see the Article 10 case
law as a whole.
Article 10 gives powers to national authorities and courts,
and creates duties for them. For example, Article 10 obliges all
courts to disregard national legislation which is contrary to Community law, even if they would not otherwise have power to treat
national legislation as invalid or unconstitutional. Article 10
gives national courts powers, when necessary, to develop new
procedures or remedies for carrying out their duties to safeguard Community law rights. This is important because the
Court interprets Article 10 as imposing essentially the same duties on judicial and non-judicial authorities. It has therefore
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ruled that a competition authority which is not a court has the
same duty as a court to disregard national legislation which is
contrary to Community law.4
The Articles in the Draft Treaty Establishinga Constitution
for Europe
The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
("Draft Constitution")' contains two articles which replace and
extend Article 10. First, Article 5, paragraph 2, addressing the
relations between the Union and the Member States, provides
that
[f] ollowing the principle of loyal cooperation, the Union and
the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each
other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Constitution.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the
Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives set out in the Constitution.6
Second, Article 10 of the Draft Constitution, dealing with Union
Law, states:
1. The Constitution, and law adopted by the Union's Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it, shall have
primacy over the law of the Member States.
2. Member States shall take all appropriate measures, general
or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations flowing from the Constitution
or resulting from the Union In7
stitutions'

acts.

These provisions usefully confirm and make explicit the reciprocal nature of the duties imposed on the Member States and the
EU institutions. More important, they extend the legal duties of
cooperation into the areas of common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. They show that those present at
the Convention which drew up the Constitutional Treaty saw no
reason to reduce the effects of Article 10, and nobody else has
seriously suggested this at any time; although the Francovich
4. Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. Autorita Garante Della Concorrenza E
Del Mercato, Case C-198/01, [2003] ECR I- _, 1 45-51, [2003] 5 C.M.L.R. 16.
5. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18,' 2003, O.J. C 169/1
(2003) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Constitution].
6. Id. art. 5, O.J. C 169/1, at 9 (2003).
7. Id. art. 10, O.J. C 169/1, at 10 (2003).
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judgment,' based on Article 10, caused governments serious
concern that there would be many claims for compensation for
breaches of Community law.
I. THE DUTIES OFJUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
A. ProceduralDuties: the Equivalence and Effectiveness Principles
In Dounias v. Ikonomikon,9 the Court repeated the formula
on equivalence and effectiveness which it had previously often
used:
...

in the absence of Community rules governing a matter, it

is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay
down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for
safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct
effect of Community law. However, such rules must not be
less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions;
nor may they 'make it impossible or excessively difficult
in
10
practice to exercise rights conferred by Community law.
The last sentence states the equivalence and effectiveness principles.
The duties of national courts to protect rights given by
Community law in accordance with these two principles derive
from Article 10. The effectiveness principle requires the Community Courts to define precisely what Community law rights require - sometimes, a precise definition of a right is needed
before a remedy for violation can be devised - and can go so far
as to oblige national courts to devise new penalties and new
kinds of remedies which are not given by national law. This is
one very important potential growth area under Article 10. The
effectiveness principle has far more potential than the equivalence principle.
In Dounias, the issue concerned a procedural rule which
empowered customs authorities to keep imported goods unless
import duty was paid, even when it was disputed. The Court said
that the principles applied to difference in procedures, and in
particular to the rules of evidence in claims against a State for
8. Francovich v. The Republic (Italy), Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-5357, [1993] C.M.L.R. 66.
9. Case C-228/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-577; Case C-255/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8003,
33,
[2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 36.
10. Dounias, [2000] E.C.R., at 58.
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breach of Community law, and left it to the national court to
apply the principles to the facts. If there is no comparable procedure for domestic cases, the test is whether the procedure
makes it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to import.
The Advocate General had said:
If the effect of the national rule at issue is - as appears to be
the case - that in practice national courts restrict the calling
of witnesses in proceedings in which such evidence is critical
to the claimant's case, the rule does not satisfy [the effectiveness] ... requirement and is accordingly contrary to Commu-

nity law.1 1

In Preston v. Wolverhampton Healthcare2 the national court
had asked about the compatibility with Community law of procedural rules on claims for benefits in a pension scheme. The
Court held that the effectiveness principle did not preclude
rules requiring claims to be made within six months of the employment ending, and limiting service within two years of making the claim. On the equivalence principle, to see whether a
right of action under domestic law is similar to proceedings
under Article 119 (now Article 141) the national court must look
at the purpose, cause of action, and essential characteristics of
the two kinds of claim. To decide whether the procedural rules
are equivalent, the national court must determine objectively
whether the rules are similar, taking into account the role of
those rules in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation
of the procedure and any special features of the rules.
The effectiveness principle requires not only legislation providing the same penalties as those for breach of corresponding
national laws, but also enforcement action and the actual imposition of by equivalent courts."3 The Commission has not yet
brought a case based on statistical evidence showing inadequate
resources or a pattern of relative under-enforcement of Community law, whether by too few prosecutions or by inadequate penalties, but may well have to do this in fisheries, for example,
11. Id. at 50.
12. Case C-78/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-3201.
13. Commission v. France, Case C-333/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1025 (concerning failure to adopt detailed rules for utilization of fishing quotas, failure to monitor adequately, not prohibiting fishing when quotas were exhausted, and failure to enforce
after prohibitions had been imposed).
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where enforcement is entirely in the hands of national authorities.
In Courage v. Crehan,14 the Court said that Community law
gives a party to a restrictive agreement a right to sue the other
party for loss caused by the agreement. "The full effectiveness of
Article 85 (now Article 81 EC) ... would be put at risk if it were
not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to
him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort com15
petition," even if the claimant was a party to the contract.
However, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are respected, national law could deny the right to obtain compensation to a party bearing "significant responsibility"
for the effect on competition. A litigant should not profit from
his own unlawful conduct. In fact, the Court could have gone
further by stating that Article 10 must require national courts to
make sure that a party is not encouraged to make a restrictive
agreement by knowing that, if profit resulted, it would be able to
keep the profit and, if loss resulted, it would be able to sue the
other party for the loss. 16
The Court elaborated the effectiveness principle in Santex
SpA v. Unita Socio SanitariaLocale No. 42."7 The Court ruled that
the Community directives on public contracts must be interpreted as imposing a duty on national courts to disapply national
limitation rules, where a public authority has made it impossible
or excessively difficult for a private party to exercise its rights
under Community law by challenging a decision of the authority
within the normal limitation period. National authorities must
not be allowed to obstruct the exercise of rights given by Community law.

14. Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6297.
15. Id. at 2.
16. In 2003, the Finance Court of Rhineland Pfalz ruled that a Commission fine
was not deductible for tax purposes under German law, except insofar as it represented
the refund of profits which themselves had suffered tax. See Finanzgericht RheinlandPfalz 2 Senat., Urteil vom 15Juli 2003, Az. 2K 2377/01. It would be contrary to Article
10 for a Member State to reduce the effect of a Commission fine by allowing it to be
deducted for tax purposes, or otherwise to reduce the cost of infringement of Community law.
17. Case C-327/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-1877. See Salafero v. Genova, Case C-13/01,
[20031 E.C.R. I--.
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B. The Duty to Avoid Conflicts with Judgments of the Court ofJustice
Weber's Wine World Handels-GmbH v. Abgabenberufungskommission 18 concerned Austrian legislation purporting to allow claims
for repayment of a tax on alcoholic beverages, if the tax had not
been passed on to third parties. This tax had been previously
declared by the Court to be incompatible with Community law.
The Court said that the legislation was contrary to Article 10 if it
was intended specifically to deal with the unlawful tax because it
would frustrate the earlier judgment. Also, refusal of refunds on
the sole ground that a tax was passed on, without considering
the degree of unjust enrichment which the refund would involve, is contrary to Community law. It is for the national court
to decide if refunds claimed under Community law are subject
to less favorable procedural rules than claims based on national
law. The principle of effectiveness prevents national rules making the exercise of Community law rights impossible in practice
or excessively difficult by establishing a presumption of unjust
enrichment on the sole ground that the duty was passed on.
In Echirolles Distribution SA v. Association du Dauphine,1 9 the
defendants had sold books at less than the price fixed by the
publisher, contrary to French legislation. They argued that the
legislation was contrary to Community rules. The Court had
previously ruled that, in the absence of a Community competition policy in the book sector, the duties of national authorities
under Article 5 were not sufficiently defined to prevent the
adoption of national laws obliging publishers to fix the retail
price of books.2 ° A national authority cannot have an obligation
under Article 10 unless the Community rule in question is clear
and precise. The essential issue was whether there was any reason for the Court to reconsider its previous judgment. Although
the Commission has recently dealt with some book pricing cases,
18. Case C-147/01, [2003] E.C.R. I- ,
86, 92, [2004] 1 C.M.L.R. 7. See Marks &
Spencer Plc v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, Case C-62/00, [2002] ECR I6325,
36, [2002] C.M.L.R. 9; State Finance Administration v. San Giorgio SpA, Case
199/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3595, 14, 2 C.M.L.R. 658; Christian Deville v. Administration
des Impots, Case 240/87, [1988] E.C.R. 3513, 13, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 611; Aprile Srl v.
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case C-228/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7141,
16;
Dilexport Srl v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case C-343/96, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-579,
39, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 791.
19. Case C-9/99, [2000] E.C.R. 1-8207.
20. See Leclerc v. "Au Ble Vert", Case 229/83 [1985] E.C.R. 1, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R.
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the Court said that there was no reason to reconsider, and that a
national court cannot call into question a judgment of the
Court.
C. The Duty of National Courts to Avoid Conflict with Decisions of
the Commission
In Masterfoods v. HB Ice Cream,2 1 the Commission had
adopted a decision that certain agreements for exclusive use of
ice-cream freezer cabinets were contrary to Article 85 of the EC
Treaty (now Article 81). The Irish courts considered that the
agreements were lawful. The Irish Supreme Court asked the
Court if the duty of national courts to cooperate with the Community institutions required them to adjourn cases to await the
judgment of the Court of First Instance concerning the validity
of the Commission's decision. The Court ruled that though the
Commission is not bound by a decision of a national court, Commission decisions are binding on the parties to whom they are
addressed unless and until they are annulled. Under Article 10,
to avoid a conflict between its judgment and the decision of the
Commission, a national court should either adjourn and wait for
the judgment of the Community Courts, or itself refer to the
Court of Justice the question of the validity of the Commission's
decision. 2
D. The Duty of National Courts to Raise Questions of Community
Law on their Own Initiative
In Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Murciano Quintero,2" the
Court held that a national court should raise, on its own initiative, the question of whether a clause in a consumer contract was
unfair and contrary to the Community directive on unfair terms.
The objective of the directive would not be achieved if a consumer, who might not be represented by a lawyer because the
21. Case C-344/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-11369. See also Opinion of Advocate General
Tizzano, IMS Health v. NDC Health, Case C-418/01, [2003] E.C.R. -,
88 (Oct. 2,
2003).
22. In IMS Health, the national court did not directly question the validity of the
Commission's decision, but instead asked several questions raising similar issues, a less
satisfactory procedure.
23. Case C-240/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4941; Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton
International NV, Case C-126/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3055; R. v. Criminal Proceedings
against Carra and Others, Case C-258/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4231,
16; Cofidis SA v. JeanLouis Fredout, Case C-473/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-10875.
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amount of money involved might be small, had to raise such a
question, and the national court had a duty to interpret the national legislation as far as possible so as to achieve the aim of the
directive.
This judgment follows previous judgments in which the
Court had said that national courts should raise questions of
Community law on their own initiative,2 4 should interpret na-

tional legislation, if possible, in accordance with Community directives, 2 5 and should interpret Community measures so as to
give such effective protection as the measure was intended to
provide.2 6 It is significant because it shows that national courts
may have a special duty to protect the interests of consumers and
claimants where only a small amount of money is claimed by
each individual, and therefore to develop effective remedies to
deal with such situations. Protection of consumers is mentioned
in both Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.2 7
E. The Duty to ProvideJudicialReview to Protect EC Law Rights
In Union de Pequerios Agricultores v. Council,2 8 the Court of
Justice confirmed the traditional interpretation of Article 230 on
the need for an applicant to be directly and individually concerned by a Community act, but added that national courts have
a duty under Article 10 to enable private parties to challenge the
legality of any national measure applying a Community act of
general application, on the grounds that the Community act is
invalid, even if they could not challenge the Community act di24. Peterbroeck Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v. Belgium, Case C-312/93, [1995]
ECR 1-4599; Kraijveld BV and Others v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland, Case C72/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-5403.
25. Marleasing SAv. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, Case C-106/
89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-4135. This duty applies between private parties, while the direct
effect of directives in other respects applies only against State bodies.
26. Coote v. Granada, Case C-185/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5199; John Temple Lang,
The Principleof Effective Protectionof Community Law Rights, in 1 JUDICLL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 235-74 (David O'Keeffe & Antonio Bavasso eds., 2000).
27. John Temple Lang, European Community Competition Policy - How Far Does it
Benefit Consumers?, 18 BOLETIN ATINO AMERICANO DE COMPETENCIA 128, 128-33 (2004).
28. Case C-50/00 P, [2002] ECR 1-6677, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1. John Temple Lang,
Actions for Declarationsthat Community Regulations are Invalid: The Duties of National Courts
Under Article 1OEC, 28 EUR. L. REv. 102 (2003);John Temple Lang, Declarations,Regional
Authorities, Subsidiarity, Regional Policy Measures and the Constitutional Treaty, 29 EUR. L.
Rv. 94 (2004). The view has been authoritatively expressed that Article 230 should be
amended. See European Union Committee, The Future Role of the European Court of
Justice, 6th Report of Session 2004-04, at 1 128-42 (H.L. Paper 47, 2004).
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rectly under Article 230. Once again, Article 10 obliges national
courts to develop or invent procedures, if necessary, to protect
rights given by Community law.
In Kofisa Italia Srl v. Ministero delle Finanze,2 9 the Court held
illegal a provision in the Italian customs code that only the customs authorities could suspend a customs decision. This would
effectively exclude the jurisdiction of the Italian courts to decide
questions of the interpretation of the Community customs Regulations. No provision can restrict the right to effective judicial
protection. The requirement of judicial control of any decision
of a national authority reflects a general principle of Community
law. National courts, in accordance with Article 10, must ensure
the legal protection which private persons derive from the direct
effect of rules of Community law. A court dealing with a dispute
governed by Community law must be able to grant interim relief
to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on
the EC Treaty law rights. This followed from the judgments in
Zuckerfabriek SuderdithmarschenAG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe 0 and in
Factortame Ltd.3 1 on the need to make interim or interlocutory
remedies available, when necessary, to protect rights given under
Community law, even if national law does not confer these powers.
In Empresas Navieras v. Administracion Generaldel Estado,3 2 the
Court was asked whether a requirement for prior administrative
authorization for a cabotage service, in order to impose public
service obligations, was compatible with freedom to provide
transport services. The Court said that, if it would derogate from
a fundamental freedom, any prior administrative authorization
scheme must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria
known in advance, so as to limit the exercise of the authorities'
discretion, and prevent it from being used arbitrarily. This, of
course, not only provides legal certainty, but also makes judicial
control easier and more effective. All persons affected by measures based on such a derogation must have a legal remedy available to them.
Similarly, in Dounias (discussed above) the Court repeated
29.
30.
31.
32.

Case C-1/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-207.
Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-415.
Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433.
Case C-205/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1271.

2004]

DEVELOPMENTS, ISSUES, AND NEW REMEDIES

1915

that under Article 10, the national courts must ensure the legal
protection of individuals and ensure that the rules of evidence
comply with the equivalence and effectiveness principles. The
Court added that "the existence of a judicial remedy against any
decision of a national authority refusing the benefit of a fundamental right conferred by the Treaty is essential in order to secure for the individual effective protection for his right."3 3
The case max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v. Commission 34 was concerned with judicial review by the Community
Courts. The Court of First Instance deliberated upon a complaint against Austria for infringement of Article 86 (ex Article
90). In an important judgment, the Court said that diligent and
impartial treatment of a complaint is part of the right to sound
administration, which is one of the general principles observed
in a State governed by the rule of law, common to the constitutional traditions of Member States, and stated in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Court further observed that
"in so far as the Commission is required to undertake such an
examination, the fulfillment of that obligation must be amenable to judicial review. '35 Judicial review is also one of the general
principles observed in a State governed by the rule of law, common to the constitutional tradition of Member States, and stated
in the Charter on Fundamental Rights.
Although the scope and depth of the judicial review by the
Court is limited in certain respects, an action against the Commission for the partial rejection of a complaint under Article 86
is admissible. This judgment, if it is upheld by the Court of Justice, has clear implications for the duties of national administrative courts in judicial review cases involving Community law, and
may well create duties for national competition authorities
whose rejections of complaints are not now subject to effective
judicial review. The right to judicial review is, of course, a prerequisite to the right to obtain effective remedies for the enforcement and protection of Community law rights.

33. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
56, [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 32 (this case is
34. Case T-54/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-313,
being appealed). See Schlfisselverlag and others v. Commission, Case C-170/02, [2003]
E.C.R. I-_.
35. max.mobil Telekommunikation, [2002] E.C.R., at 56.
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F. The Duty to Set Aside National Law Rules, If Necessary to Protect
EC Law Rights
In Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen v. Engelbrecht,36 the Court was
asked how the Community rules on pensions for migrant workers applied to a national rule reducing a worker's pension because his wife had a pension from another Member State. The
aim of the Treaty would not be met if, through exercising their
right to freedom of movement, migrant workers were to lose social security advantages guaranteed to them by the law of any
Member State. Under Article 10, a national court must, as far as
possible, interpret national law in a way which complies with EC
law. The Court referred to van Munster v. Rijksdienst voor Pen3 8 The
sioenen v and MarleasingSA v. La Comercial Internacional.
Court said that if national law could not be applied in accordance with Community law, the national court must fully apply
Community law and protect the rights conferred by it on individuals, if necessary disapplying any national law rule which would
lead to a result contrary to Community law. Apart from the cases
referred to by the Court, this is also based on the same principle
as Factortame. In Factortame, the effect was that the national court
was obliged not merely to set aside a rule of national law, but to
give a new remedy which had not previously existed (the provisional suspension of an Act of the U.K. Parliament).
Similarly, a national court has a duty to disregard a collective agreement which is inconsistent with Community law. The
national court must use all the means at its disposal to end discrimination, in particular by benefiting the disadvantaged, and
should not wait until the illegal provisions have been set aside by
39
legislation or by a new collective agreement.

36. Case C-262/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-7321. See Duchon v. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt, Case C-290/00, E.C.R. I-,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 23; Criminal Proceedings against
Carra and Others, Case C-258/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4217, 16. See Fiammiferi v. Autorita
Garante, Case C-198/01, [2003] ECR I-(discussed below).
37. Case 165/91, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4661. See Paraschi v. Landesversicherungsanstalt
Wurttemberg, Case C-349/87, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4501.
38. Case C-106/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-4135.
39. See Kutz-Bauer v. Hamburg, Case C-187/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-2741.
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G. The Duty to Provide Procedures to Allow EC Law Rights to be
Claimed: Actions for Declarations, Class Actions,
and Discovery
In SuperiorFruiticolav. FrumarLtd.,4° the Court decided, in a
briefjudgment, that compliance with regulations on quality standards could be enforced by civil proceedings for an injunction
brought by a competitor, and not only by a public authority or a
consumer. This is necessary to ensure the "full effectiveness" of
the regulations. The Advocate General in Fruiticolahad said that
a competitor can rely on the direct effect of the Regulation, as it
has an interest, protected by the Regulation, in compliance with
the Regulation by its competitors. Non-compliance with the Regulation results in an unlawful act adversely affecting other competitors. He specifically added that, under Article 10, Member
States are obliged to secure implementation and enforcement of
regulations, that penalties must be effective, must have a deterrent effect, and be proportionate, and that therefore competitors must have a right to get an injunction.4" But national law
may require the competitor to have an actual economic interest,
and to exhaust other remedies.
An important and unresolved question is whether national
courts have a duty under Article 10 to enable groups of consumers or other individuals to join together to claim compensation
in accordance with the principles stated in Crehan when each
individual's claim is so small that it is impracticable to enforce it
by court proceedings, but the total number of consumers affected is large, even when the national procedural laws do not
otherwise provide for class actions. It seems likely that Article 10
does require this, at least in consumer protection cases and competition law cases, and the Oceano Grupo judgment provides
some confirmation of this. This would greatly increase the number of claims for compensation under European competition
law.
Article 10 may also require national courts to give declarations as to the rights of plaintiffs under Community law if that is
the only way, or the only effective way, in which the rights can be
40. Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7289; see Dansk Supermarked v. Imerco, Case
58/80, [1981] E.C.R. 181, 1 17; Boehringer v. Swingward Ltd., Case C-143/00 [2002]
E.C.R. 1-3703,
36.
41. Fruiticola, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7289, at 53-54.
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safeguarded and upheld. There is also a strong argument for
saying that Article 10 (the effectiveness principle) obliges national courts to be more willing than they have usually been in
civil law countries to order defendants to disclose all their internal documents concerning conduct which appears contrary to
Articles 81-82. Absence of effective discovery procedures is a serious obstacle to private claims for compensation in some Member States.
H. Liability Under the Francovich Principle
In Haim v. Nordrhein,4 9 the Court was asked whether compensation for loss caused to individuals by violations of EC law by
a public-law body may be paid by that body, or only by the State.
The Court said that Community law did not prevent the body in
question being liable, in addition to the Member State. It is the
duty of each Member State to ensure that individuals obtain
compensation, whichever authority is responsible for the violation or for making reparation. The conditions for reparation for
loss must not be less favorable than those relating to similar national claims (the equivalence principle). In fact, if the authority responsible for causing loss had to pay the compensation itself, one would assume that the law would be more effectively
enforced.
I. The Duty to Safeguard FundamentalRights in Commission
Competition Inspections
In Roquette, the Court was concerned with the duties of national courts under Article 10 to ensure that Community action,
including Commission inspections, is effective, and also to ensure that it respects Community rules on fundamental rights.4"
These duties "take into account the requirements flowing from
the duty to cooperate in good faith as enshrined in .. . [Article
10 EC]."4 The national court must ensure that the Commission's powers are not supplemented or enforced by coercive national measures which are arbitrary or disproportionate to the
subject matter of the investigation. If the national court is not
42. Case C-424/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5123.
43. See Roquette Freres SA v. Directeur General de la Concurrence, Case C-94/00,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-9011,
30, 32, 35, 76, 80, 91.
44. Id. at 30.
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satisfied that the Commission's explanations justify the coercive
measures which have been requested, the court, under Article
10, may not simply dismiss the request, but must explain the difficulties and ask for clarification.
J. The Duty of National Courts to Respect the Jurisdiction of the
Community Courts, and the Commission's Duty to Help
National Courts
In European Community v. First and Franex,45 the Court dealt
with a case where a national court had requested the Commission to provide information which would enable an expert to
assess whether the Commission had taken sufficient steps to
avoid loss to the plaintiffs. The Court held that, as the Community Courts have exclusive jurisdiction in claims against the Community for compensation, a national court should not order preparatory measures for the purpose of making such a claim. In
other words, the national court had been too inventive.
However the Court went on to repeat what it had said in
Zvartveld,4 6 that if a national court needs information which only
the Commission can provide, the Commission has a duty under
Article 10 to provide it, unless there is some clear justification for
not doing so.
K. The Liability of a Member State for Breach of Community Law by
a Supreme Court
In Kdbler v. Republik Osterreich,4 7 the Court had to decide
whether a Member State could be liable for compensation if its
supreme court had violated Community law. The Advocate General had pointed out that Article 10 required States to eliminate
the unlawful consequences of breaches of EC law.4" The Court
did not refer to Article 10 directly, but referred to its case-law on
the liability of States for breaches of EC law based on Article 10,
and confirmed that in certain circumstances a State may be liable for loss caused by a breach by a supreme court. This judgment goes some way to solve the problem which may arise if a
45. Case C-275/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-10943.
46. Case C-2/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3365.
47. Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-_. See Commission v. Italy, Case C-129/00,
[2003] ECR I--.
48. Opinion of Advocate General Leger, Kobler v. Republik Osterreich, Case C224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I--,
32, 55.
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national supreme court fails to refer a question under Article
234 when it ought to do so.
L. The Duty of a National Court of Final Appeal Under Article 234
In Valente v. Fazenda Publica,49 the question was whether the
fact that the Commission had ended its proceedings against a
Member State altered the duty of the national supreme court
under Article 234 to refer to the Court of Justice any EC law
issue to be decided, even if the issue in the two proceedings was
the same. The Court said that the obligation of a national court
under Article 234 is based on cooperation between the Court of
Justice and national courts, as courts responsible for the application of Community law, to ensure the proper and uniform application of Community law in all Member States, and to prevent
national case-law contrary to community law from being established. The Commission has no power to decide conclusively
whether a Member State is in breach of its obligations, or to give
any guarantees in this respect. The rights and duties of Member
States can be decided only by the Court of Justice. The Court
therefore treated the duty of a national court of final appeal
under Article 234 as an example of the broader duty of cooperation under Article 10.
M. The Duty to Adopt Penalties to Enforce Community Rules
In Andrade v. Director da Aflandega, ° the Court was asked
whether a national customs law, by which goods overdue for
clearance were either sold or subject to a surcharge, was contrary
to the principle of proportionality. The Court repeated that
when Community law provides no penalty for breach of Community rules or envisages that national law will provide it, Article 10
imposes a duty to take all measures necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Community law. Penalties imposed by national law
must comply with the effectiveness principle and the equivalence principle, as well as the principle of proportionality.
Andrade concerned the duty of national courts under Article
10 to ensure that penalties imposed by national law for breach of
Community law complied with these three principles. As far as
49. Case C-393/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1327.
50. Case C-213/99, [2000] E.C.R. 1-11083; Boehringer v. Swingward Ltd., Case C143/00 [2002] E.C.R. 1-3703, 1 136.
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the principle of equivalence is concerned, the national court
could simply impose the fine provided for a similar breach of
national law. But a national court could probably impose a penalty for breach of a Community regulation in order to comply
with the effectiveness principle, even if the national court has no
power under national law to impose a penalty for any similar
violation. It would seem to be judicial legislation for any court to
determine the minimum penalty needed to make Community
law effective, and to adopt a criminal penalty without a statutory
basis in national law. But the logic of the effectiveness principle
may require this. The legal basis for the penalty would be the
Community regulation, combined with Article 10.
It is clear from the Factortamejudgmentthat a national court
may have both the duty and the power under Article 10 to give a
remedy which did not otherwise exist under national law, in order to protect a right given by Community law. It would be logical to say that a national court should impose a criminal penalty
on a private citizen in order to enforce a duty imposed by Community law. The principle nullapoena sine lege would not prevent
it, because there would be a prohibition imposed by the Community: the only thing lacking would be the penalty which would
normally be imposed by national legislation.5 Such an issue
may arise in connection with the Community fisheries policy.
One possible solution would be for the national court to find
that there had been an infringement of the Community regulation, prohibit the private party from continuing the infringement, and adjourn the imposition of the penalty until the necessary national legislation was enacted. That legislation should be
retroactive, as it should specify penalties for any breach of the
Community law rule which occurred after that rule came into
force.
The position would be different if the Community measure
was a directive. An unimplemented directive can confer rights
on private parties against State authorities, but it cannot create
duties for private parties.5 2 The question, therefore, would arise
51. Contra.LR af 1998 A/S v. Commission, Case T-23/99, [2002] E.C.R. I- , 221
(dealing with pre-insulated pipes). The Court there said that the principle of nonretroactivity requires that "fines imposed on an undertaking for infringing the competition rules correspond with those laid down at the time when the infringement was committed." Id.
52. See Salamander v. European Parliament, Case T-172/98, [2000] E.C.R. 11-2487.
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only if a directive had been implemented but the implementing
national measure provided no penalty, or specified a penalty
which was insufficient to fulfill the effectiveness principle.
N. A Duty to Prevent Misuse of Documents Obtained in
Competition Cases
In the context of Community competition rules, the Commission gives documents and information to interveners which
would otherwise be confidential, and which they would not otherwise obtain, for the purposes of the Commission's procedure.
The Commission does not always tell the companies receiving
such information that they should not use it for any other purpose, and the Commission's instructions to this effect, if given,
would not necessarily alter (though they would certainly clarify)
the legal position. The Commission has no power under Article
10 to create new legal duties. However, when companies receive
information in such circumstances, at least when the Commission has advised them that they are not free to use it for any
other purpose, a national court should enjoin them from using
it in any other way, and, if appropriate, order compensation for
the owners of the documents. Community law probably includes
or implies a duty to use the documents or information only for
the purpose for which the parties received it. Even if this is so, it
is not clear whether, for example, the party receiving the documents would be free to use them in proceedings for breach of
Community competition rules before a national competition authority or in a national court (presumably it could use them), or
for breach of national competition law (probably it could not
use them).
This is one of a number of situations in which national
courts may have a duty to order remedies, when they are asked
to do so, to enforce principles of Community law which the
Commission itself has no power to enforce directly (although
the Commission could ask the national court for an injunction).
0. Litigation Between Private Parties
Many of the duties of national courts under Article 10 arise
in cases brought against the authorities of a Member State, or
against the State itself. But all cases against private parties for
breach of Community law must begin in national courts, and Ar-
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ticle 10 requires the courts to give remedies when the defendant's duty under Community law is clear and no other remedy
is available. This would apply for instance, if a former Community official was acting in breach of his or her duties of confidentiality.
National courts also have a duty not to enforce clauses in
contracts which are contrary to overriding principles of EC law.
This duty arises most often under EC rules on equal pay and
competition rules. But the duty would also prevent enforcement
of, for example, a contract to indemnify against a Commission
fine, or a clause intended to prevent a private party from giving
evidence to the Commission. A national court has both a duty
and a power under Article 10 to prevent a party from abusing
rights, whether under statute or contract, to cause a breach of
Community law.5 3 At least some rules of Community law are
overriding rules of public policy which prevail over private contracts.

54

P. The Duty to Refer Questions to the Court of Justice When National
Judgments Conflict
Although the question has not come before the Court of
Justice, a national court probably has a duty under Article 10 to
refer a question of Community law if there are conflicting judgments of national courts of similar authority on the issue,
whether the national courts are in the same or different Member
States. This duty would be particularly clear where uniform application is important, for example, customs questions.55 Article
10 also creates a duty on a national court to give weight to a
judgment of a national court in another Member State on an
issue of Community law.
Q. Private Rights to Claim Damages and Injunctions on the Basis of
Article 10
It is clear that in many circumstances private parties have
106 (Ch. 2002) (re53. See Intel Corp. v. Via Tech. Inc., [2002] E.W.H.C. 1159,
versed on other grounds, Court of Appeal, [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1905); see also Dansk
Supermarked v. Imerco, Case 58/80, [1981] E.C.R. 181, 9 17.
54. See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd.v. Benetton Int'l NV, Case C-126/97, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-3055.
55. See Valente v. Fazenda Publica, Case C-393/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1327 (dealing
with the duty of national courts to ensure uniform application of Community law).
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rights to claim damages and to seek injunctions, declarations, or
judicial review of State action under Article 10. It seems that the
existence of this right depends largely on whether the Community law rule or objective which Article 10 requires to be fulfilled
is directly applicable or not. This seems to have been taken for
granted by national courts, but in Francovich the court held that,
under certain conditions, a private party can recover compensation against a State even for breach of a directive, which by definition is not directly applicable.
II. THE DUTIES OF NON-JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
A. The Duty to Use Community Procedures and to Cooperate with the
Commission to Resolve Difficulties
In Commission v. France,5 6 the Court said that a Member
State may not question the validity of a State aid decision addressed to it, in the course of proceedings brought against it
later for failure to comply with the decision. If a Member State,
when carrying out a Commission decision on State aid, encounters unforeseen or unforeseeable difficulties, or becomes
aware of consequences not contemplated by the Commission, it
must submit the problems for consideration by the Commission,
with proposals for amending the decision. The Commission and
the State must respect the duty of cooperation imposed by Article 10, and must work together in good faith to overcome difficulties while respecting the Treaty rules.
The Court had occasion to say substantially the same thing
in Commission v. Belgium,5 7 in which the Commission had criticized Belgium for failing to comply with a State aid decision ordering Belgium to recover illegal aid. Belgium argued that compliance was difficult, but the Court ruled that Article 10 obliges
the State and the Commission to work together to resolve the
difficulties.
B. The Duty Not to Encourage or Approve Infringements of
Community Competition Rules
In Arduino v. Compagnia,5" the Court was asked whether Arti56. Case C-261/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-2537.
57. Case C-378/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-5107,
33-37, 50.
58. Case C-35/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1529. See France v. Ladbroke Racing, Joined
Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6265; Conte v. Rossi, Case C-221/99,
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cle 10 prevents a Member State from adopting a measure approving a tariff of fees for lawyers, on the basis of a draft produced by a professional lawyers' body. The Court repeated what
it has often said before, that Article 10 requires Member States
not to introduce or maintain in force measures which may
render ineffective the competition rules applying to enterprises.
This prohibits the State from favoring or requiring the adoption
of agreements contrary to Article 81, from reinforcing their effects, or from delegating to private operators responsibility for
decisions affecting the economic sphere. 59 The tariff proposed
by the Italian lawyers' body was only a draft, and was not binding. The Minister who approved the tariff was advised by two
public bodies. Italy therefore had neither delegated regulatory
responsibilities nor required or encouraged the adoption of
agreements contrary to Article 81, nor reinforced the effects of
such an agreement.
The Advocate General, in an important Opinion in Arduino,
had made it clear that a State measure may infringe Articles 10
and 81 independently of the lawfulness of the conduct of the
private parties who propose it. A State measure might be contrary to the Treaty because it restricted competition, even if the
behavior of the private parties which gave rise to the State measure was lawful. But a Member State may have legitimate reasons
for restricting competition, and a measure which reinforces the
effect of an agreement is lawful if the State exercises effective
control over the content of the agreement, the State measure
pursues a legitimate aim in the public interest, and the measure
is proportionate to the aim which it pursues.
The Arduino case involved two distinct principles. The first
was that States must not require, encourage, or reinforce infringements of Article 81. The second broader principle,6"
[2001] E.C.R. 1-9359. See also AOK Bundesverband v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes,
Case C-264/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-_.
59. Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Netherlands v. Commission, Case
C-48/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-565, 616.
60. In relation to the freedom of establishment, the freedom of services, and the
freedom to compete, see the following judgments: van Binsbergen, Case 33/74, [1974]
E.C.R. 1299; Coenen v. Sociaal-Economische Raad, Case 39/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1547;
Bond von Adverteerders, Case 352/85, [1988] E.C.R 2055; Commission v. Netherlands,
Case C-353/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4069; Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat
voor de Media, Case C-288/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4007; Sdger v. Dennemeyer, Case C-76/
90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4221; Corbeau, Case C-320/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2533; Her Majesty's
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which is discussed below, is that Member States may restrict freedoms given or guaranteed by the Treaty (including freedom of
competition) only if the State is pursuing a legitimate objective
in the public interest, and is doing so by proportionate means.
This second principle applies whether or not the State measure
was prompted by any kind of agreement or proposal which, if it

had been adopted by private parties, might have been contrary
to Article 81.
The distinction between these two principles reinforces the
importance of the argument which the Advocate General made.
In a democracy, it must be lawful for competitors to join in asking the legislature or other public authorities to adopt measures,
provided that the competitors do not do anything which infringes Article 81. Such a request or submission cannot be less
lawful because the competitors requested it. The principle that
State measures restricting freedom of establishment and services
must have legitimate objectives and be proportional, must apply
whether the measures were initiated by private interests or by an
official request. State measures which do not fulfill these conditions are contrary to Community law, and in particular to Article
10.
C. The Duty Not to Limit or Regulate FundamentalFreedoms without
AdequateJustification
It is well established by a long line of cases that a Member
State must not enact or maintain measures which regulate or restrict the fundamental freedoms of establishment, services,
movement of capital and individuals, and (apparently) also competition, without adequate justification in the public interest,
Customs and Excise v. Schindler, Case C-275/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1039; Crespelle, Case
C-323/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5077; Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financien, Case
C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1141; Franz~n, Case C-189/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-5909, 5976-77;
I.C.I. v. Colmer, Case C-264/96, [1998] E.C.R. 14695,
28-29; Parodi v. Banque Bary,
Case C-222/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3899; Reina v. Seymour Smith, Case C-167/97, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-623; Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs, Case C-212/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-1459; Vlaamse
Televisie v. Commission, Case T-266/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2329; Opinion of Advocate
General La Pergola, Lddrd v. Kihlakunnansyyttaja, Case C-124/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-6067;
di Verona v. Zenatti, Case C-67/98, [1999] E.C.R. 1-7289; Mac Quen, Case C-108/96,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-837; Commission v. Italy, Case C-58/99, [2000] E.C.R. 1-3811; Commission v. Portugal, Case C-367/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-4731, 49; Commission v. France, Case
C-483/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-4781,
45; Commission v. Belgium, Case (-503/99, [2002]
E.C.R. 14809,
45; John Temple Lang, State Measures Restricting Competition, 2
EuRoPArrsLIG TIDsKRiFr 206 (2001).
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and other than by means which are necessary and proportionate
to the objective sought. This principle is based ultimately on Article 10.
The Court substantially clarified this principle in Piergiorgio
Gambelli and several other judgments. 6 Gambelli concerned Italian regulation of gambling. The Court said that reserving the
collection and transmission of sporting bets for the State and its
licensees was a restriction on freedom of establishment and services which would be permissible only if it was necessary and proportionate. Management of revenue is not a public interest objective which justifies restrictions on these freedoms. The objective cannot justify a restriction if it is not consistently pursued, or
if the means used to pursue it are discriminatory.
D. The Power and Duty of a National Competition Authority to
DisregardNationalMeasures Restricting Competition
In an important judgment in Fiammiferi v. Autorita Garante,6 2
the Court decided that a national competition authority applying Community competition law is bound to disregard national
legislation requiring anticompetitive conduct, if the legislation is
contrary to Community law because it requires or leads to a
breach of Articles 81-82. This duty (with the corresponding
power given by Community law) arises from Article 10.63 That
Article requires Member States not to introduce or maintain
measures, even if legislative or regulatory, which may make ineffective the competition rules applying to enterprises. The duty
to disregard or disapply national measures applies to non-judicial authorities as well as courts. Member States' obligations
under Article 10 are distinct from the duties of enterprises
61. See Piergiorgio Gambelli, Case C-243/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-_; Lindman, Case G42/02, [2003] ECR I-_; Anomar v. Estado portugues, Case C-6/01, [2003] E.C.R. I--;
van Financien v. Verkooijen, Case C-35/98 [2000] ECR 1-4071, 1 48, 59 (holding that
aims of a purely economic or revenue nature not enough to justify restriction); Ambulanz Gl6ckner v. Landkreis Sudwestpfalz, Case C-475/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-8099 (finding
that extension of a dominant position by national measure requires justification). Considerations of a purely administrative nature, or of administrative convenience, are not
37, 76.
enough. See Arblade v. Leloup, Case C-369/96, [1999] E.C.R. 1-8453,
45-51. See Connect Austria v. Telekom62. Case C-198/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-_,
Control, Case C-462/99, [2003] E.C.R. 1-5197.
63. See Stato v. Simmenthal, Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629; Ahmed Saeed v. Zentrale, Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 803; Fratelli Constanzo v. di Milano, Case 103/88,
[1989] E.C.R. 1839.
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under Articles 81-82. However, penalties can be imposed only
for conduct committed after it has been definitively ruled that
the national measure is contrary to EC law.
Fiammiferi is important because it confirms that, although
much of the case-law under Article 10 deals with the duties of
national courts, the Court regards non-judicial authorities as
having duties similar to, and as strict as, those of courts under
Article 10. The significance of Fiammiferi is not limited to competition authorities, and it shows that Article 10 confers powers,
as well as duties, on regulatory and other non-judicial authorities, within the spheres of their competences. These powers will
have to be recognized by national administrative courts in appeals against the decisions of these authorities.
E. Other Duties of a National Competition Authority
In Royal PhilipsElectronics v. Commission,64 the Court of First

Instance was asked to annul a Commission decision allowing a
merger on conditions, and referring part of the case to the
French competition authority. The Court dismissed the application, noting that the French authority was bound by Article 10 in
its examination of the case. If there was a subsequent breach of
Article 10, the Commission could, if necessary, bring proceedings against France.
Recently, a new issue has arisen. The Commission is now
imposing much higher fines for infringement of Community
competition rules, than have been imposed in the past. This
policy is partly moderated by the effects of Notice on Leniency,6 5
under which the Commission guarantees to reduce the otherwise appropriate fine if a company voluntarily gives the Commission full information about a price-fixing agreement. However,
if a national competition authority used the information so disclosed to impose a full fine for violation of national competition
law, it would defeat the aims of the Leniency Notice (just as a
national tax authority which allowed a company to deduct a
Commission fine against its tax liability would be acting contrary
64. Case T-119/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-_,
370, 383; Cableuropa v. Commission,
198.
Joined Cases T-346/02 and 347/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-_,
65. Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel
Cases, O.J. C 45/3 (2002) (replacing a previous Notice); John Temple Lang, The Implications of the Commission's Leniency Policy for National Competition Authorities, 28 EUR. L.
REV. 430 (2003).
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to Article 10, because it would be altering the effective cost of
the fine to the company). It seems clear, therefore, that to avoid
interfering with the operation of the Community policy on leniency, national competition authorities have a duty under Article
10 not to impose full fines under national law using information
disclosed to the Commission which has led the Commission to
impose no fine, or a reduced fine.
National competition authorities applying Community competition rules are obliged, under Article 10, to respect Community general principles of procedural due process. 66 But it is not
yet clear whether a national competition authority to which the
Commission transfers a complaint under Reg. 1/2003 has a duty
to give the parties all the same procedural rights as they would
have in a Commission procedure. If there is no such duty, the
transfer substantially alters the rights of the parties, and must be
open to challenge under Article 230. The arrangements between the Commission and the national competition authorities
of Member States are set out in Notices or guidelines agreed between them. While this kind of act is not formally binding (the
Commission has no power under Article 10 to issue binding instructions), these arrangements will be binding under Article 10
because they have been agreed to and are intended to regulate
the cooperation between the Commission and the national authorities. (When a Member State agrees to do certain things to
resolve a legal disagreement between it and the Commission, to
help to resolve a difficulty, or to deal with a competition case
between the Commission and a company, the State's promise is
legally binding under Article 10 because it is made in the context of a legal arrangement and is intended to regulate legal relationships).67 It is not yet clear how far these Notices on cooperation will create legal rights for companies, whether under Article
10 or under the principle of legitimate expectations.6 8
Another substantive issue under Article 10 is likely to arise
because Regulation 1/2003 allows national competition law to
go further in abuse of dominance cases than Article 82. Some
national laws seem to protect competitors from competition, for
66. See supra notes 34-35 (commenting on max.mobil Telekommunikation).
67. See John Temple Lang, Community ConstitutionalLaw: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27
COMMON MKT.

L. REv. 645, 668-69 (1990).

68. John Temple Lang, Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectations as General Principles
of Law, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 2, at 163-84.
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example, by strict non-discrimination rules. But a national decision which in fact protected a competitor against competition,
even if it was based on national competition law, would be contrary to Article 3 of the EC Treaty, which says that competition is
a Community objective. So such a national decision would be
contrary to the duties of the competition authority under Article
10, and would be open to challenge in national administrative
courts.6 9

F. The Duty to Reopen Administrative Procedures
In Kiihne & Heitz v. Productschap, ° the Court had to answer
a question which referred expressly to Article 10. If an administrative body is asked to review a final administrative decision to
take account of an interpretation given subsequently by the
Court, has it a duty to reopen the case? The Court said it had a
duty under Article 10, but only under the following conditions:
1) the administrative body has power under national law to reopen its decision; 2) the earlier decision became final as a result
of a judgment of a national court of final instance which did not
refer a question under Article 234; 3) the judgment might have
been based on a misinterpretation; and 4) the interested party
asked immediately for the case to be reopened.
G. Duties of Telecommunications Regulatory Authorities to Ensure
that the Community's WTO Obligations are Fulfilled
The individual implementation of the Community's obligations under the World Trade Organisation agreements on telecommunications is the responsibility of national telecommunications regulatory authorities. If the wording of the Community
directives implementing the WTO obligations, or the wording of
the national legislation implementing the directives, does not
correspond precisely to the words of the WTO obligations, the
national regulatory authorities have a duty under Article 10 to
ensure that their decisions comply not only with the relevant
Community directives but also with the WTO obligations. Oth69. John Temple Lang, Anticompetitive Non-pricing Abuses Under European and National Antitrust Law, in 2003 FORDHAm CoRP. L. INST. 235, 23540, 335-39 (B. Hawk ed.,
2004).
70. Case C-453/00, [20041 E.C.R. I--.
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erwise the Community might be in breach of its international
obligations.
H. The Duty to Safeguard Specially Protected Areas Under the
Habitats and Bird Conservation Directives
Another issue arose, but was not resolved, in Re WWVF-UK
and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.7 Areas had been set
aside for special protection under the two Community directives
on habitats and bird conservation, but there was extensive tourist
skiing activity nearby. If this activity interfered with wildlife conservation in the special protection areas, it would be contrary to
Article 10 to allow the interference to continue.
I. Article 10 and InternationalInstitutional Questions
Although Article 10 has proved to be surprisingly important
in the international relations of the Community in the past, 72 it
has arisen less often in the period under review. In the Tobacco
Advertising Directive case, 73 Advocate General Fennelly referred to
it when discussing whether the directive was consistent with the
principle of subsidiarity. He said that when harmonization of national laws is needed, "collective action by the 15 Member States
(for example by way of a treaty concluded under public international law) is excluded, in my view, as a matter of law, having
regard, in particular, to the terms of Article 5 of the EC Treaty
(now Article 10)."7 It would be contrary to Community principles to use an international agreement between Member States
to do something which could appropriately be done by a directive, because it would mean that Article 234 would not apply to
the interpretation of the measure, and because the validity of
the measure could not be challenged under Article 230 (since it
would not be an act of a Community institution) but would have
to be challenged indirectly in proceedings by the Commission
71. [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1021; Council Directive No. 92/43, OJ. L 206/7 (1992)
(habitats); Council Directive No. 79/409 OJ. L 103/1 (1979) (bird conservation). See
Damian Chalmers, The Application of Community Law in the United Kingdom, 1994-1998, 37
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 83, 126-27 (2000).
72. See HELSIN~i GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 412-13.

73. See Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Germany v. Parliament and Council, Case C-376/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-8419.
74. Id. at
136.
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against the Member States concerned under Article 226. 7
J. Air Navigation Agreements
In the air navigation judgments, the Court held that it was
contrary to Article 10 for a Member State to enter into bilateral
air navigation agreements with a non-Member State. The Court
quoted Article 10, and went on:
In the area of external relations ... the Community's tasks
and the objectives of the Treaty would be compromised if
Member States were able to enter into international commitments containing rules capable of affecting rules adopted by
the Community or altering their scope... by entering into or
maintaining in force.. . international commitments concerning air fares and rates charged by carriers designated by the
United States of America on intra-Community routes and
concerning CRSs offered for use or used in Belgian territory,
the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations
under Article 5 .. .
Advocate General Tizzano in his opinion in the air navigation
cases 7 7 referred to the duty of Member States under Article 10 to
cooperate with the Community institutions to enable the States
to amend their existing agreements. He distinguished between
agreements which were in conflict with Community rules, agreements which cover the same subject-matter as Community rules,
and those which are "liable to affect" Community rules.
Advocate General Tizzano said that the logic of the Community competence theory is that Member States could not undertake international obligations in matters governed by common
rules even to eliminate conflicts between those rules and their
earlier bilateral agreements. If only the Community is competent, but is not able to conclude international agreements directly, it would be necessary, in accordance with the principles
75. See Leonesio v. Ministero, Case 93/71, [1972] E.C.R. 287.
76. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-471/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9681, 9 125-26. See
Commission v. Denmark, Case C-467/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9519,
110-12; Commission
v. Sweden, Case C-468/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9575, 9 106-08; Commission v. Finland,
Case C-469/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9627, 9 111-13; Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C472/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9741, 19 116-18; Commission v. Austria, Case C-475/98, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-9797, 9191124-26; Commission v. Germany, Case C-476/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9855,
91 135-37. These cases involved one of the most important explicit uses of Article 10
ever made by the Court.
77. Belgium, [2002] E.C.R., at 91 74-75, 115, 117.
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laid down in Article 10, for its institutions and the Member
States to cooperate to enable the States to amend the existing
agreements in a manner consistent and in accordance with the
Community's interest. Member States should seek authorizations to negotiate amendments themselves, on the basis of
agreed Community positions and procedures. If necessary, they
should continue to look to the Community to achieve the solution most apt to ensure the greatest possible adherence to Community principles. If necessary, they should adopt concerted action in negotiations. In any event, they should take into consideration their obligations under Community law, and keep
themselves informed of the interests of the other Member States.
In turn, the Community institutions should give Member States
their full cooperation in the search for appropriate solutions, including assistance in the negotiations, where possible.
K. The Limits of Article 10
In PreussenElektra v. Schleswag,"8 German legislation obliging
certain companies to buy, at minimum prices, electricity produced from renewable energy sources, had the effect of guaranteeing producers of that electricity, without risk, higher profits
than they would otherwise have made. The cost of this obligation was borne by electricity supply companies and upstream private electricity network operators. The question was whether
this benefit to the producers of this kind of electricity was State
aid. The Commission argued that, to preserve the effectiveness
of the Treaty Articles on State aid, they should be interpreted in
conjunction with Article 10 so as to include financial support
given by State measures, even though it is financed by obligations imposed on private interests. The Court said that Article
10 does not extend the scope of the State aid Articles to conduct
by States which does not fall within those Articles. The Court
rejected the analogy, suggested by the Commission, of the principle that Article 10 prohibits Member States from encouraging
agreements by companies which are contrary to Article 81, since
the State aid Articles apply directly to State measures.
Another limit on the extent of Article 10 arose in Pavlov v.
78. Case C-379/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-2099.
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Pensioenfonds Medische. 9 It had been argued that the decision of
a Member State to make membership of a pension fund compulsory for all members of a profession is contrary to Article 10.
The Court said that as the profession's request to have membership made compulsory was not contrary to Article 85 (now Article 81), the measure which made it compulsory was not contrary
8
to Article 1 0 . 0
L. The Duty to Protect FundamentalFreedoms
In Ferlini v. Centre hospitalier,8 the question was whether a
Member State has a duty to prevent discrimination on the
grounds of nationality by healthcare providers affiliated with a
national social security scheme. The Court held that this was
contrary to Article 6 of the EC Treaty.8 2 But the Advocate General also said that Member States may have a duty under Article
10 to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that
fundamental freedoms are respected, and he referred to the
French farmers' case.8 3
M. The Duty of Community Institutions to Respect Each
Others' Powers
The Community institutions have a duty to respect each
others' powers. The Court of Justice has recognized this in the
context of litigation over the place of meetings of the Parliament."4 However, the Parliament itself does not seem always to
respect this principle, since it has, on a number of occasions,
encroached on the exclusive right of the Commission to propose
Community measures. Parliament has even sometimes given the
Commission a draft (no doubt drafted by a lobbyist) of the measure the Parliament wants the Commission to propose, or told
79. Joined Cases C-180/98 and C-184/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-6451,
95-101. See Arduino, Case C-35/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-1529.
80. This may not be logical. See Arduino, [2002] E.C.R. 1-1529.
81. Case C-411/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-8081.
82. Id. at
26.
83. See Commission v. France, Case C-265/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6959; Schmidberger
v. Republik Osterreich, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659.
84. Luxembourg v. Parliament, Case 230/81, [1983] E.C.R. 255; Parliament v.
Council (Chernobyl), Case C-70/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2041; Greece v. Council, Case 204/
86, [1988] E.C.R. 5323; France v. Parliament, Case 358/85, [1988] E.C.R. 4821; Parliament v. Council, Case C-65/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-643; Parliament v. Council Case, C-392/
95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3213.
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the Commission how it should decide a competition case on
which the Parliament had heard no evidence or arguments. Resolutions calling on the Commission to propose measures are not
legally binding on the Commission, and the Commission is free
to ignore them. So the Commission would not be able to ask the
Court to annul such a resolution of the Parliament. But some
resolutions seem to infringe the principle of reciprocal respect
for the competences of the institutions. The question would
arise in a competition case (whether a State aid case, a merger,
or a case under Articles 81-82) before the Community Courts if
there was any evidence that the Commission had. been influenced in any way by a resolution of the Parliament: any such
influence would be improper, and if proved, would presumably
lead to the Commission's decision being annulled.
N. Directives and Article 10
Article 10 has been referred to in a series of judgments of
the Court of Justice involving failure to transpose or fully to implement directives, or the effect in national courts of incomplete
or incorrect transposition. 5 In Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik, 6 one of the questions asked by a national court was
whether, when the directives on review procedures for public
contracts had not been implemented, the review bodies for public supply and public works contracts could also deal with reviews
of public service contracts. The Court said that, under Article
10, Member States are obliged to achieve the result prescribed
by the directive and to take all appropriate measures, general or
particular, to fulfill that obligation, and that this obligation applies, for matters within their jurisdiction, to national courts.
National courts, therefore, must interpret national law as far as
possible to achieve the result required by the directive. Even
when the directive has not been transposed, the question of the
body competent to hear appeals in relation to public service contracts is relevant, and individuals may be able to rely on the directive against a defaulting Member State. If the national law
cannot be appropriately interpreted and applied, the individual
may be able to recover compensation from the State. The na85. See
TICIABILIT9,

GENERAL REPORT, LES DIRECTIVES COMMUNAUTAIRES: EFFETS, EFFICACIT9, JUSCONGRESS, STOCKHOLM (Bernitz ed., 1998).

XVIII FIDE

86. Case C-258/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-1405.
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tional court should therefore decide whether, in the light of
these requirements of Community law, the national law allows
an appeal, and to what bodies. This judgment is an extremely
clear indication that national courts should do everything which
they consider possible to interpret and apply national law in a
way which is consistent with Community law.
In Commission v. Italy,8 7 Italy had set up authorities for draw-

ing up plans for dealing with certain industrial accidents, but the
plans had not all been drawn up. The Court used the traditional
formula that, under Article 10,
the Member States are to take all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from action
taken by the institutions of the Community directives... are
binding as to the result to be achieved ....

Under the

Court's case-law, that obligation implies, for each Member
State to which a directive is addressed, adopting, within the
framework of its national legal system, all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues.88
The objective of the directive would be compromised if Member
States did not ensure that the plans and inspections were completed."9
Commission v. Ireland" involved simple non-transposition of
a directive. The Court noted that under Article 249 (ex Article
189) directives are binding as to the result to be achieved, and
that under Article 10 Member States are required to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfillment of obligations arising
from the Treaty. Member States may not rely on circumstances
in their domestic legal systems to justify a failure to comply with
a directive.
In Jimenez Melgar v. Los Barrios,9 1 the Court again used the
87. Case C-336/97, [1999] E.C.R. 3771.
88. Id. at
19.
89. For examples of where the Court used the same language, see Commission v.
France, Case C-320/99, [2000] E.C.R. 1-10453; Commission v. France, Case C-97/2000,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-2053 (public contracts); Commission v. France, Case C-207/2000,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-4571 (television broadcasting); Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C119/2000, [2001] E.C.R. 1-4795 (television broadcasting).
90. Case C-213/98, [1999] E.C.R. 1-6973. The Court used the same language in
Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-138/99, [1999] E.C.R. 1-9021.
91. Case C-438/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-6915.
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traditional formula, and added that since the directive on measures to improve the safety and health of mothers had direct effect, even in the absence of transposition measures, the directive
confers on individuals rights on which they can rely before a national court against the authorities of the State, including municipalities.
It will be seen that the Court distinguishes between the duty
to bring national law into line with the directive, which results
directly from Article 249 (ex Article 189), and the duty to adopt
supplementary or consequential measures to make the directive
fully effective, which (if the circumstances make it relevant) results from Article 10. This is an interesting example of how Article 10 supplements other rules of Community law.
In this context it is worth mentioning the English High
Court judgment R. (ex parte T-Mobile) v. Competition Commission
and Director General of Telecommunications.92 Insofar as relevant to
Article 10, it was argued on behalf of the companies that the
telecommunications access directive prevented the adoption of
any controls over the prices of termination calls in the period
before the directive took effect. The High Court rejected this
interpretation of the directive, since the principles of Community law, founded upon Article 10, are sufficient. Member States
are required to refrain from taking any measures liable seriously
to compromise the results required by a directive, even if the
date for its implementation has not yet expired. But they may
introduce a new regulation in the meanwhile so long as it does
not seriously compromise the new regime.
0. The Duty to Supply Information to the Commission
It is well established that even in the absence of any express
duty under Community secondary legislation, national authorities have duties under Article 10 to provide information requested by the Commission to enable it to assess whether the
Member State is in breach of its obligations under EC law. This
93
was confirmed once again in Commission v. Luxembourg.
69; Inter Environnement Wallonie v. R192. [2003] E.W.H.C. 1555 (Admin),
gion Wallonne, Case C-129/96, [1997] E.C.R. 1-7411.
93. Case C-478/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-2351 (patent agents).
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P. A Duty to Apply National Laws Adequately for Purposes of
Mutual Recognition
In a variety of areas, national authorities are obliged to recognize authorizations granted by other Member States and are,
in effect, not allowed to question or criticize them. Each national authority depends on the others to ensure that their own
laws are properly applied, so that mutual recognition will bejustified. This means that there is a duty under Article 10 on every
national authority to ensure that it applies its own law fully and
thoroughly.
CONCLUSIONS
The Court has continued to apply its case-law under Article
10 in a relatively straightforward way to both substantive and procedural issues. However, it has been given few opportunities to
answer new questions or call attention to new implications. It
rejected the only new argument made by the Commission (in
PreussenElektra), but that argument was clearly made opportunistically. The Commission has still not been trying to use Article
10 on new issues. However, the fact that the Court has needed
to deal with so few new issues under Article 10 is a sign of the
scope, richness, and variety of the Court's previous judgments
under this Article, (especially those on the principle of equivalence and the principle of effectiveness), which have proved sufficient to resolve all the issues which have recently arisen before
it. This also helps to explain why the Court so often refers to its
previous judgments without mentioning the Article which is
their legal base. Surprisingly, few practicing lawyers seem to
have tried to use Article 10. It is not clear whether practitioners
have failed to make Article 10 arguments in national courts, or
whether national courts have not thought it necessary or appropriate to refer them to the Court. However, there seems to be a
gradual increase in the number of cases in which Article 10 is
applied or referred to, both in cases referred by national courts
and cases brought directly in the Court ofJustice. The Court of
First Instance also shows an increasing tendency to cite Article
10, but its case law deserves a separate paper, and is not dealt
with here.
This Article has identified a number of practical issues for
which Article 10 is relevant, which are likely to be raised in the
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Community Courts or in national courts. Whatever the answers
may be to the questions raised here, the questions are clearly
important, and will certainly have to be answered in due course.
Article 10 still has considerable potential for producing new
kinds of practical consequences.
At the FIDE conference in Helsinki, it was suggested that
the case law on Article 10 can be summarized by saying that national authorities and courts have a legal duty to make the Community legal system work in the way that it was objectively intended to work. 4 That still seems a valid summary, although the
Court looks at each specific situation and has not tried to state
any wider principles. That is another reason why the importance
of Article 10 continues to be underestimated. Its importance
should become obvious if and when similar new provisions apply
to foreign and security policy and to justice and home affairs.

94. See HELSINKI GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 373-426 (vol. I), 65-72 (vol. IV);
Durand, in 1 COMMENTAIRE MEGRET, supra note 2, at 25-43; Temple Lang, The Duties of
Cooperation, supra note 2, at 84.

